Shangri-La Arms Race: Or Follow the Money
Personal_Finance / Military Spending Jun 07, 2018 - 05:50 PM GMTBy: Dan_Steinbock
	 
	
   As the Trump administration seeks to boost arms sales in  Asia, the Shangri-La Dialogue is morphing into a marketing arm of Western arms  exporters in Asia.
As the Trump administration seeks to boost arms sales in  Asia, the Shangri-La Dialogue is morphing into a marketing arm of Western arms  exporters in Asia.
At the Shangri-La Summit, U.S. Defense Secretary  James Mattis accused China of "intimidation and coercion" in the  Indo-Pacific. "Make no mistake: America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay.  This is our priority theater," he said. What Mattis left unsaid was why America wants to stay in Asia and how U.S. defense contractors hope to  turn the region into a weaponized cash cow.
  
 
What the Shangri-La Summit illustrated (and seeks to reverse) are the new economic and strategic realities in Asia, as reflected by vital, longstanding shifts in arms transfers in the region. While the U.S. defense system remains the most innovative in the world, U.S. global military leadership continues to erode. This is particularly clear in Asia where China increasingly accounts for investment and jobs in many economies (which tends to support regional stability), but the U.S. no longer doesn’t. Instead, and as a result, America’s role relies less on its now-waning economic dominance and increasingly on its military presence, which is legitimized on the basis of the alleged “Chinese threat” (which tends to destabilize regional stability).
Yet, new data indicates that even U.S. military position in the region is under relative erosion – as evidenced by the military transfers of China and Russia and some other countries in the region.
Arms  exports pivoting to emerging Asia
  In the past half a decade, the largest arms exporters have  been the U.S., Russia, China and to a lesser degree France, Germany and the UK.  Together, the six account for some 80% of the total volume of arms exports  worldwide. Other exporters are minor players in the region, representing NATO  (France, Spain, UK, Germany) and its partners (Ukraine, Israel, Sweden). 
  Today, the main recipient region of arms imports is  Asia/Oceania, which accounts for some 42% of global imports – nearly as much as  the Middle East and Europe together. In the postwar era, the U.S., along with a  few NATO countries, was the primary arms supplier in Asia. Today, only two  countries rely only on U.S. arms imports: Japan and Taiwan, which both source  almost 100% of their arms imports from the U.S. Others tend to be more  diversified, including Australia (61% from the U.S.) and South Korea (51%).  Singapore (71%) has steadily increased its arms imports from the U.S., whereas  Afghanistan (59%) is decreasing supplies from the U.S. (Figure).
  The rising major arms exporters in the Asia/Oceania region  include Russia and China. While China is becoming self-sufficient militarily,  it still imports some arms, mainly from Russia. As an arms supplier itself,  China is the primary supplier to Pakistan (70%), Bangladesh (71%), and Myanmar  (68%), and a secondary importer to Thailand. 
  Interestingly, India, despite its rapidly-growing strategic  reliance on the U.S., currently imports most of its arms from Russia (62%) and  only 15% from the United States. Vietnam is a similar case. Despite its  strategic reliance on the U.S. in the Southeast China Sea disputes, it depends  almost exclusively on Russia (82%) for arms supplies. Furthermore, Russia  remains a vital secondary arms importer to Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Myanmar. 
  Indonesia and Thailand hedge their  bets more than their peers. The former relies on imports from Western powers  (U.S., UK, South Korea), whereas Thailand’s importers are more diversified  geographically (Ukraine, China, Sweden).
Figure: Top-14 Arms Importers in Asia and their main suppliers*
  Main  suppliers (share of importer’s total imports, %, 2013-17)
  Importer  1st,  2nd, 3rd supplier and the rest    

Source: Data from SIPRI, March 2018.
Six  trends in regional arms imports
  In the postwar era, the U.S. still dominated much of Asia  both economically and strategically. As decolonization swept across former  (particularly British and French) colonies, America purposefully exploited the  vacuum. Most importantly, amid the Cold War, it created the security  architecture in the region – including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  (SEATO) which was signed in Manila, Philippines, in the mid-50s - whose stated  role was to contain the Soviet Union and Communism. Hence, the U.S.-led wars  from the Korean Peninsula in the early 1950s and the massacre of almost a  million alleged Communists and Chinese in Indonesia in the mid-‘60s to the war  in Vietnam and the associated destabilization in the former Indo-China in the  ‘70s.
  Until the late ‘70s, when the SEATO was dissolved, these  moves supported reconstruction particularly in Japan and South Korea, while the  concern for “Communist expansion” (read: Mao’s China) also translated to  supported economic expansion in two former British colonies, Hong Kong and  Singapore, which favored U.S. military presence and associated economic  spillovers in the region. As these four Asian tigers – the  “newly-industrialized countries” - got back on their feet, they began to  offshore productive capacity elsewhere (and associated US strategic power) in  emerging Southeast Asia. In the Middle East and South Asia, the Central Treaty  Organization (CENTO), created in 1955 and dissolved in 1979, played a similar  strategic role.
  However, today, the region looks very different. America’s  economic role is gradually descending, and even its military position, as  reflected by U.S. arms transfers, has declined from the Cold War era. At the  same time, China has matured into a major economic contributor in the region,  particularly as economic spillovers associated with One Road One Belt (OBOR)  initiatives are spreading. 
  Second, Russia and China offer increasingly sophisticated  military technologies, but for a lower price than the U.S. and its advanced  allies. Third, the cost factor remains a key consideration to countries that  have been close U.S. allies in the past (Indonesia, Thailand). Others have been  alienated by U.S. unipolarity (Pakistan, Afghanistan). 
  Fourth, in the past half a decade, India has been the  largest arms importer worldwide and accounts for 12 percent of the global  total. During the period, its imports from the U.S. soared by more than 550%:  that's one reason why the U.S. Pacific Command was renamed the U.S. “Indo-Pacific”  Command. Understandably, Washington would prefer to contain China's rise by  endangering Indian rather than U.S. lives, somewhat like Imperial Britain once  relied on indirect rule in India to minimize British casualties. In New Delhi,  increased U.S. arms imports reflect the Modi government’s effort to diversify  imports sources, however. If anything, India seeks for greater strategic  independence. In the short-term, the interests of these two great nations are  converging; in the long-term, they may diverge.
Some countries, like Australia and South Korea, rely on U.S.  arms imports, but have joined OBOR initiatives. Assuming positive OBOR  spillovers, other economies (Indonesia, Thailand) that are similarly positioned  may be expected to diversify away from Western imports in the future. 
Following  the money - From IISS Shangri-La to General Dynamics
  Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies  (IISS), the Shangri-La Dialogue has intimate ties with the British government  and Western security interests. The IISS's major funders are the world’s  leading military contractors (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, BAE  Systems, ADS Group), oil giants (BP, Chevron, Shell, Statoil), and major  government and private sector interests, as evidenced by the IISS own reports.  The summit itself is sponsored largely by the IISS's military donors, as  evidenced by its website.
  What unites the IISS’ U.S. donors is not so much a concern  over China than a concern of being left out of the rearmament party. In fiscal  2017, the U.S. sold nearly $42 billion in weapons to foreign countries, but  $8 billion (20% of the total) to the Indo-Pacific region, which remained behind  the Middle East. Yet, in global arms transfers, the Asia Pacific is the most  lucrative region (over 40% of world total). As U.S. defense contractors see it,  they could and should double their revenues in the region.
  Unsurprisingly, then, U.S. Secretary of Defense, James  Mattis is pushing for U.S. arms deals worldwide, especially in Asia. After  retirement from the Marine Corps, Mattis served in the Board of Directors of  General Dynamics, a leading U.S. defense contractor with $31 billion in annual  revenues. It is led by Phebe Novakovic, former official of the CIA and the  Department of Defense. Last December, Novakovic said the Asia-Pacific is a  growing market for U.S. defense contractors. “People spend money on defense  when they’re worried, and many of our allies in Asia are justifiably worried,”  she added. To win over “unsophisticated buying authorities” and discourage  national efforts to build indigenous capabilities, she advocated “upgrades to  their current platforms... to be able to communicate to fight together should  the need arise.”
  Now, the point here is not to argue— as one might on the  basis of a blood-testing startup embroiled in scandal, or the so-called Theranos debacle, another board membership that Mattis had  to resign — that there is collusion between the U.S. government, the  Pentagon, leading defense contractors and U.S. “allies in Asia.” Rather, the  risks are in the moral hazards inherent in the (far-too) intimate ties among  these different players. It is precisely such risks that will always make  destabilization preferable to defense contractors, which is then legitimized by  the government leaders as a “moral imperative.”
What the Asia Pacific needs is peace, stability and economic  development. Left unchecked, rearmament in the region will ensure the eclipse  of the Asian Century – before it has started. 
Dr Steinbock is the founder of the Difference Group and has served as the research director at the India, China, and America Institute (USA) and a visiting fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more information, see http://www.differencegroup.net/
© 2018 Copyright Dan Steinbock - All Rights Reserved
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