Best of the Week
Most Popular
1.U.S. Housing Bull Market Over? House Prices Trend Forecast Current State - Nadeem_Walayat
2.The Coming U.S. Economic Collapse Will Trigger a Revolution - Harry_Dent
3. Stock Market Crash a Historical Pattern? - Wim_Grommen
4.Global Panic - U.S. Federal Government Stockpiling Ammo – Here’s What We’re Going to Do - Shah Gilani
5.AI, Robotics, and the Future of Jobs - Aaron Smith
6.This is Your Economic Recovery With and Without Drugs - James_Quinn
7.Gold and Silver Price Getting Set To Explode Higher - Austin_Galt
8.The Something for Nothing Society - Lifecycle of Bureaucracy - Ty_Andros
9.Another Interesting Stock Market Juncture - Tony_Caldaro
10.Inflation vs the Deflationary Straw Man - Gary_Tanashian
Last 5 days
Stock and Commodity Market Ratio Messages - 2nd Sep 14
Gold Price - The Thin End of the Wedge - 2nd Sep 14
U.S. Inflation Pressures in Core Food Components - 2nd Sep 14
Independent Scotland Currency, Plan A, B, C or D - British or Scottish Pound? - 2nd Sep 14
Gold and Silver Price A Critical Juncture - 2nd Sep 14
Gold and Silver Precious Metals Complex Contradiction and Potential - 2nd Sep 14
France And The Long-Gone Thatcher Moment - 2nd Sep 14
Stock Market Approaching An Important High? - 2nd Sep 14
Gold, Silver Price Summer Doldrums Coming to an End - 2nd Sep 14
The Ultimate Demise Of The Euro Union - 1st Sep 14
Palladium Price Breaks Multi-Year High Over $900 - 1st Sep 14
When Complexity Becomes Chaos - 1st Sep 14
Designer War By Default - 1st Sep 14
Islamic State or Russia? Ten Key Questions Towards Pragmatism - 1st Sep 14
Mixed Emotions for the Gold Market - 1st Sep 14
These Clowns Are Dragging Us Into War with Russia - 1st Sep 14
Marx And The Capitalist Cancer Of Overproduction - 1st Sep 14
Scottish Banks Salivating at the Prospects for an Independent Scotland of 6 Million Debt Slaves - 1st Sep 14
Small Man Europe Is Now In “Effective State Of War” With Russia - 31st Aug 14
The Unintended Blowback Of False Flags - 31st Aug 14
Tesco Supermarket Death Spiral Latest Profits Warning and Dividend Slashed - 31st Aug 14
Dow, Gold and Silver - A Last Stand, A Fake Out And A Surge - 31st Aug 14
If U.S. Consumers are so Confident Why aren't They Spending? - 31st Aug 14
Scotland Independence House Prices Crash, Deflationary Debt Death Spiral - 31st Aug 14
Obama’s “Catastrophic Defeat” in Ukraine - 30th Aug 14
Stock Market Inflection Point Approaching - 30th Aug 14
Gold And Silver - Elite's NWO Losing Traction. Expect More War - 30th Aug 14
Corporations Join Droves of Americans Renouncing US Citizenship - 30th Aug 14
Peter Schiff U.S. Housing Market, House Prices Bubble Warning - 30th Aug 14
Russia, Ukraine War - It’s Time to Play the “Gazprom Card” - 29th Aug 14
The One Tech Stock Investment You Should Never Sell - 29th Aug 14
Bitcoin Price $500 as Current Downside Barrier - 29th Aug 14
Don't Get Ruined by These 10 Popular Stock Market Investment Myths - 29th Aug 14
Low Cost Transcontinental Gold - 29th Aug 14
Gold Bullish Central Banks Should Give Money Directly To The People - Helicopter Janet? - 29th Aug 14
US House Prices Bull Market Over? Trend Forecast Video - 29th Aug 14
The Fed Meeting at Jackson Hole Exposed Yellen’s Greatest Weakness - 29th Aug 14
AAPL Apple Stock About To Get sMACked - 29th Aug 14
A History of Unlimited Money: Learn From It or Repeat Its Mistakes - 29th Aug 14
How You Can Play to Win When Market Makers Are Calling the Shots - 28th Aug 14
EU Gas Supply Is In Real And Imminent Danger - 28th Aug 14
Central Banks at the Root of Evil - 28th Aug 14
European Bond Market: Bubble of all Bubbles! - 28th Aug 14
Employers Aren’t Just Whining: The “Skills Gap” Is Real - 28th Aug 14

Free Instant Analysis

Free Instant Technical Analysis


Market Oracle FREE Newsletter

The Biggest lie in Stock Market History Revealed

Sovereign Debt Crisis, Have We Crossed the Point of No Return?

Economics / Global Debt Crisis May 21, 2010 - 02:10 AM GMT

By: Philipp_Bagus

Economics

Best Financial Markets Analysis ArticleA specter is haunting the world, and especially Europe: the specter of a sovereign insolvency. The acute sovereign-debt crisis is largely the result of government interventions in response to the financial crisis.

As Austrian business-cycle theory explains, the credit expansion of the fractional-reserve-banking system had caused an unsustainable boom. At artificially low interest rates, additional investment projects were undertaken even though there was no corresponding increase in real savings.


The investments were simply paid by new paper credit. Many of these investments projects constituted malinvestments that had to be liquidated sooner or later. In the present cycle, these malinvestments occurred mainly in the overextended automotive, housing, and financial sectors.

The liquidation of malinvestments is beneficial in the sense that it purges inefficient projects and realigns the structure of production to consumer preferences. Factors of production that were misused in malinvestments are liberated and transferred to projects that consumers want more urgently to be realized.

Solutions to the Crisis: Diverging Paths

In the present recession, the liquidation of malinvestments — falling housing prices and bad loans — caused problems in the banking system. Defaults and investment losses threatened the solvency of banks. The solvency problems triggered a liquidity crisis in which maturity-mismatched banks had difficulties rolling over their short-term debt.

At the time, there were alternatives available to tackle the solvency problem and recapitalize the banking system. Private investors could have injected capital into the banks that they deemed viable in the long run. In addition, creditors could have been transformed into equity holders, thereby reducing the banks' debt obligations and bolstering their equity. Unsustainable financial institutions — for which insufficient private capital or creditors-turned-equity-holders were found — would have been liquidated.

Yet the available free-market solutions to the banks' solvency problems were set aside, and another option was chosen instead. Governments all over the world injected capital into banks while guaranteeing the liabilities of the banking system. Since taxes are quite unpopular, these government injections were financed by the less-unpopular increase in public debts. In other words, the malinvestments induced by the inflationary-banking system found an ultimate sponsor — the government — in the form of ballooning public debts.

There are other reasons why public debts increased dramatically. Governments undertook additional measures to fight against the healthy purging of the economy, thereby delaying the recovery. In addition to the financial sector, other overextended industries received direct capital injections or benefited from government subsidies.

"Access to cheap credit allowed countries such as Greece to maintain a gigantic public sector and ignore the structural problem of uncompetitive wage rates."

Two prime examples of subsidy recipients are the automotive sector in the United States (for instance, the infamous "Cash for Clunkers" program) and the construction sector in Spain. Such subsidies further delayed the restructuring of the economy. Factor mobility was hampered by public works absorbing the scarce factors needed in other industries. Greater subsidies for the unemployed increased the deficit while reducing their incentives to find work outside of the overextended industries. Another factor that added to the deficits was the diminished tax revenues caused by reduced employment and profits.

Thus, government interventions not only delayed the recovery, but they delayed it at the cost of ballooning public deficits — increases which are themselves adding to preexisting, high levels of public debt. The preexisting public debts are the artifacts of war expenditures and unsustainable welfare states. As the unfunded liabilities of public-pension systems pose virtually insurmountable obstacles to modern states, in one sense the crisis — with its dramatic increase in government debts — is a leap forward toward the inevitable collapse of the welfare state.

The Situation in Europe

In Europe there is an additional wrinkle in the debt problem. At the creation of the euro, it was implicitly assumed among member nations that no nation would leave the euro after joining it. If things went from bad to worse, a nation could be rescued by the rest of the European Monetary Union (EMU). With this implicit bailout guarantee, a severe sovereign-debt problem was preprogrammed.

The assumed support of fiscally stronger nations artificially reduced interest rates for fiscally irresponsible nations. Access to cheap credit allowed countries such as Greece to maintain a gigantic public sector and ignore the structural problem of uncompetitive wage rates. Any deficits could be financed by money creation on the part of the European Central Bank (ECB), externalizing the costs onto fellow EMU members.

From a politician's point of view, the incentives in such a system are explosive: If I as a campaigning politician promised gifts to my voters in order to win the election, I can externalize the costs of those promises to the rest of the EMU through inflation — and future tax payers will have to pay the debt. Even if the government needs a bailout (a worst-case scenario), it will happen only in the distant, post-election future.

Moreover, when the crisis occurs, I will be able to convince voters that it was not caused by me, but rather that it fell upon the country as a natural disaster — or that (better still) it was caused by evil speculators. While accompanying austerity measures imposed by the EMU or IMF may loom in the future, the next election is just around the corner. In such a situation, the typical shortsightedness of democratic politicians combines with the ability to externalize deficit costs to other nations and produces an explosive debt inflation.[1]

"Greece does not seem to be on track to becoming self-sufficient in just three years."

Due to these incentives, some European states were already well on their way to bankruptcy when the financial crisis hit and deficits exploded. Markets started to become distrustful of many government promises. The recent Greek episode is an obvious example of such market distrust. As politicians want to save the euro experiment at all costs, the bailout guarantee has become explicit. Greece will receive loans from the EMU and the IMF, totaling an estimated €110 billion over the next three years. In addition, even though Greek government bonds are rated as junk, the ECB continues to accept them and has even started to buy them outright.

There also exists the danger of contagion from Greece to those other countries — such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland — which have high deficits and debts. Some of them suffer from high unemployment and inflexible labor markets. A spread to these countries could trigger their insolvency — and the end of the euro. The EMU reacted to this possibility and went "all in," pledging together with the IMF an additional €750 billion support package for troubled member states in order to stem the threat of contagion.

Why Governments Cannot Contain the Crisis

Can this €110 billion bailout of Greece, combined with the €750 billion of additional promised support, stop the sovereign-debt crisis, or have we crossed the point of no return? There are several reasons why political solutions may be incapable of stopping the spread of the sovereign-debt crisis.

  1. The €110 billion granted to Greece may itself not be enough. What happens if in three years Greece has not managed to reduce its deficits sufficiently? Greece does not seem to be on track to becoming self-sufficient in just three years: it is doing, paradoxically, both too little and too much to achieve this. It is doing too much insofar as it is raising taxes, thereby hurting the private sector. At the same time, Greece is doing too little insofar as it is not sufficiently reducing its expenditures. In addition, strikes are damaging the economy and riots endanger the austerity measures.

  2. By spending money on Greece, fewer funds are available to bail out other countries. There exists a risk for some countries (such as Portugal) that not enough money will be available to bail them out if needed. As a result, interest rates charged on their now-riskier bonds were pushed up. Although the additional €750 billion support package was installed in response to this risk, the imminent threat of contagion was stopped at the cost of what will likely be higher debts for the stronger EMU members, ultimately aggravating the sovereign-debt problem still further.

  3. Someone must eventually pay for the EMU loan at 5 percent to Greece. (In fact, the United States is paying for part of this sum indirectly through its participation in the IMF.) As the debts of the rest of the EMU members increase, they will have to pay higher interest rates. Portugal is paying more for its debt already and would currently lose outright by lending money at 5 percent interest to Greece.[2] As both total debts and interest rates for Portugal increase, it may soon reach the point where it cannot refinance itself anymore. If Portugal is then bailed out by the rest of the EMU, debts and interest rates will be pushed up for other countries still further. This may knock out the next weakest state, which would then need a bailout, and so on in a domino effect.

  4. The bailout of Greece (and the promise of support for other troubled member states) has reduced incentives to manage deficits. The rest of the EMU may well think that they, like Greece, have a right to the EMU's support. For example, since interest rates may stabilize following the bailout, pressure is artificially removed from the Spanish government to reduce its deficit and make labor markets more flexible — measures that are needed but are unpopular with voters.

Sovereign-debt problems, therefore, may have reached a point beyond remedy — short of default or high rates of inflation. It is likely that with the bailout of Greece we have already passed this point of no return.

Notes
[1] For the time horizon of politicians in democracies, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy: The God That Failed (Transaction Publishers, 2001).

[2] It is thus unclear whether countries that pay higher interest rates than 5 percent will participate.

Philipp Bagus is an associate professor at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid and a visiting professor at Prague University. Send him mail. See Philipp Bagus's article archives. Comment on the blog.

© 2010 Copyright Ludwig von Mises - All Rights Reserved Disclaimer: The above is a matter of opinion provided for general information purposes only and is not intended as investment advice. Information and analysis above are derived from sources and utilising methods believed to be reliable, but we cannot accept responsibility for any losses you may incur as a result of this analysis. Individuals should consult with their personal financial advisors.


© 2005-2014 http://www.MarketOracle.co.uk - The Market Oracle is a FREE Daily Financial Markets Analysis & Forecasting online publication.


Post Comment

Only logged in users are allowed to post comments. Register/ Log in

Free Report - Financial Markets 2014